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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT HEARING: PROMPT
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ALL FOURTH




What type of protection does the Fourth Amendment, with its
prohibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures,"' provide a
defendant who is imprisoned based solely on the actions and judgment of
a police officer? Does the Fourth Amendment require judicial review of
such warrantless state action? And if so, how swift must that judicial
review be? It appears that "prompt" judicial review is required for
warrantless government seizures, that is, warrantless arrests, that result
in imprisonment. The Supreme Court has held that a judge must
determine, in a timely manner, whether probable cause existed for a
• • 2
warrantless arrest that leads to prolonged incarceration. Without a
quick judicial decision on the merits of the arrest, any continued
imprisonment could be an unreasonable seizure. What about warrantless
government searches that result in jail time? Should not the same
"prompt" judicial review requirement apply to these searches as apply to
warrantless arrests? Or are warrantless seizures that result in
imprisonment a greater threat to the rights guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment than warrantless searches that result in imprisonment? Is
such hierarchical thinking justifiable in the Fourth Amendment context?
* J.D. Candidate, May 2006. The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. The author wishes to thank the members of the Lehigh County, Pennsylvania
criminal justice system, whose names can be found in the footnotes of this Comment, for
their time and their insight. In particular, the author would like to thank Judge Kelly
Banach for her guidance and advice throughout the writing process. The author also
would like to thank his parents for their unconditional love and support, without which he
may have found himself on the wrong end of a Gerstein hearing. Finally and most
importantly, the author would like to thank his wife, Patterson. Her belief in him, her
constant love, and her never-ending sacrifice have made the last three years possible.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975). The Supreme Court reviewed a
Florida law that permitted the government to detain a person charged by information "for
a substantial period solely on the decision of a prosecutor." Id. at 106. The Court
determined that such a detention could easily result in an illegal seizure and "that the
Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite
to extended restraint of liberty following arrest." Id. at 114.
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A Judge assesses the legality of a warrantless search at a suppression
hearing.3 If a warrantless search is held illegal, the judge will exclude any
evidence obtained as a result of the search from use at trial. 4 But the
Supreme Court has never addressed the timeliness or the requirement of
a suppression hearing! As a result, several months may pass before a
neutral and detached judge will pass on the legality of a warrantless
6
search. For a defendant who is incarcerated based solely on evidence
obtained through an illegal search, the suppression hearing offers little
consolation since "[p]retrial confinement may imperil the suspect's job,
interrupt his source of income, and impair his family relationships."7
Plea bargains offer an alternative means for an individual in prison as a
result of an illegal warrantless search to end the ongoing "unreasonable
seizure." Due to the realities of the criminal justice system, not every
case can be litigated.' The government handles its overwhelming
criminal caseload by offering defendants favorable sentences in exchange
for a guilty plea.9 A plea bargain and the corresponding guilty plea are
viewed as beneficial to all involved;10 but plea bargains prevent judicial
review of warrantless searches and result in convictions based on illegally
obtained evidence." In a situation where an imprisoned defendant has
been subjected to an illegal search, a plea bargain and its promise of
freedom present a more attractive option than a suppression hearing,
which will not be held for months, and its Fourth Amendment remedy of
3. See, e.g., PA. R. CRIM. P. 578-581 (illustrating Pennsylvania's requirements for
and use of a suppression hearing).
4. See, e.g., id. R. 581(I)-(J).
5. See Commonwealth v. DeBlase, 665 A.2d 427, 431 (Pa. 1995) (using a two-prong
analysis to determine if a violation of a defendant's right to a speedy trial has occurred).
In Pennsylvania, the scheduling of a suppression hearing cannot run afoul of the state's
rules of criminal procedure or the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a "speedy trial." Id.
Pennsylvania implemented its rules of criminal procedure "to give substantive effect to the
United States Supreme Court's observation that state courts could ... establish fixed time
periods within which criminal cases must normally be brought by the Commonwealth."
Id.
6. Compare PA. R. CRIM. P. 580 ("[A]lI pretrial motions shall be determined before
trial."), with id. R. 600 ("Trial in a court case ... against the defendant, when the
defendant is incarcerated on that case, shall commence no later than 180 days from the
date on which the complaint is filed.").
7. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114.
8. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (pointing out the additional
resources the criminal justice system would need if every case went to trial).
9. See id. (acknowledging the vital role plea bargaining plays in the "administration
of justice").
10. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) (highlighting the advantages of
plea bargaining for the defendant, the prosecution, and judges).
11. See infra Parts II.E.5, III.B.
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the exclusionary rule.12 Is a plea bargain a satisfactory replacement for a
judicial determination of the legality of a warrantless search or does it
emphasize the importance of a prompt determination by an independent
judge of all Fourth Amendment warrantless conduct?
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures."13  An illegal search by the federal or state
government violates that mandate, but nothing can "'cure the invasion of
the defendant's rights which he has already suffered."" 14 Therefore, the
prevention of Fourth Amendment violations is the best guarantee of the
Fourth Amendment's protections.15 To that end, courts have aimed to
deter law enforcement officials from violating the Fourth Amendment by
excluding evidence obtained by an illegal search from use at trial.1
6
A different scenario presents itself when an individual is arrested
without a warrant and imprisoned-an ongoing seizure. No independent
determination as to the arrest's legality has occurred and, therefore, the
reasonableness of the ongoing seizure is uncertain. The Supreme Court
declared the stakes regarding Fourth Amendment protections as "high"
in such a warrantless situation. 7 Specifically, "the Fourth Amendment
requires a [prompt] judicial determination of probable cause as a
prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following [a warrantless]
arrest." 8 States' rules of criminal procedure follow this mandate by
requiring an arraignment before a magistrate "without unnecessary
delay" after a warrantless arrest.' 9 However, no such requirement exists
12. Compare Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 71 (discussing benefits of plea bargaining), with
PA. R. CRIM. P. 580, 581(E) (discussing time period for suppression hearing).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 540 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)).
15. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (discussing the purpose of
the exclusionary remedy for Fourth Amendment violations as "compel[ling] respect for
the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the
incentive to disregard it").
16. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to
state courts); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding that evidence
illegally seized cannot not be used in federal court); see also United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974) (stating that the exclusionary rule has as its primary purpose
"deter[ring] future unlawful police conduct").
17. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., PA. R. CRIM. P. 519(A) (requiring a preliminary arraignment "without
unnecessary delay" when a defendant is arrested without a warrant); id. R. 540 cmt. (citing
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), for the proposition of "prompt
determination of probable cause before a defendant may be detained"). The prompt
judicial review at an arraignment, however, is of the arrest itself. See id. R. 519, 540(D)
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to determine the validity of a warrantless search that leads to
imprisonment; an imprisoned defendant will have to wait several months
for a suppression hearing for that judgment.' ° Yet this runs afoul of the
Fourth Amendment, which makes the stakes just as high for a
warrantless search that leads to an ongoing seizure as it does for a
warrantless arrest.21
This Comment addresses the timing of judicial review of the legality of
a warrantless search that results in the arrest and imprisonment of a
defendant. First, this Comment discusses the requirement of
independent judicial review in ensuring the guarantees of the Fourth
Amendment. In doing so, this Comment then covers the necessary
promptness of judicial review in the realm of warrantless arrests that lead
to imprisonment, and examines the exclusionary rule, the remedy for
defendants who are incarcerated due to illegal warrantless searches.
Then, through analyzing one state's criminal justice system for
illustrative purposes, this Comment reveals what is in practice an
untimely application of the exclusionary rule. This Comment then
focuses on the dangers of an untimely suppression hearing, in particular,
the increased jail time for illegally searched defendants, the exploitation
of the plea bargain system, the replacement of the neutral judge with the
prosecutor, and the dilution of the purpose of the exclusionary rule. This
Comment concludes that criminal procedures need to alter the timetable
for judicial review of warrantless searches that result in the incarceration
of defendants; and such an alteration would properly address the
unreasonable imprisonment of a defendant, serve the purpose of the
exclusionary rule, and strike the correct Fourth Amendment balance.
(stating the necessary determination of probable cause for warrantless arrests with no
discussion of warrantless searches).
20. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. In fact, evidence that is illegally
obtained and would be inadmissible at trial can be the basis for a magistrate holding that
probable cause existed for an arrest. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §
1.6(d), at 168 (3d ed. 1996). Professor LaFave discusses the use of evidence in preliminary
hearings and finds that "the prevailing view... is.. . the magistrate may take into account
evidence offered by the prosecution without regard to whether that evidence was obtained
by an illegal search." Id. As a result, an illegal search can uphold the legality of an arrest
and the continued imprisonment of a defendant. See id.
21. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987) ("Although the interest protected
by the Fourth Amendment injunction against unreasonable searches is quite different
from that protected by its injunction against unreasonable seizures, neither the one nor the
other is of inferior worth or necessarily requires only lesser protection." (citation
omitted)); cf. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747-48 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment) (explaining that a difference exists between the interests protected by a search
and a seizure and, as a result, the difference affects the application of the "plain view"
doctrine). Justice Stevens, however, does begin his analysis by stating, "our Fourth
Amendment cases sometimes refer indiscriminately to searches and seizures." Id. at 747.
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II. APPLICABLE PRECEDENT
A. An Introduction to the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment, composed of only one sentence, which
includes the Reasonableness Clause and the Warrant Clause, has created
a deluge of federal and state case law and scholarly commentary.22 The
boundaries of a "search" and a "seizure" are not bright lines, but rather
they require a case-by-case analysis.23 Furthermore, the primary remedy
for violations of the Fourth Amendment's guarantees has been
"vigorously debated by legal commentators. 2 4 Despite some ambiguity
and disagreement, the Fourth Amendment protects individuals from
unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials.' The
determination of what is "unreasonable" often involves balancing the
22. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 757, 759, 816-17 (1994) (calling the current state of Fourth Amendment law and
analysis a "doctrinal mess" and suggesting a new approach to Fourth Amendment law
centered on a "reasonableness norm"); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth
Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1500-01 (1985) (suggesting two possible models for
Fourth Amendment analysis since the Supreme Court has created a "mire of contradiction
and confusion"); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse Than
the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994) (critiquing Professor Amar's article); Carol S.
Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 825, 846-47, 856-
57 (1994) (arguing that warrants, probable cause, and the exclusionary rule should be the
cornerstone of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth
Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383,
384-86 (1988) (reviewing the relationship of the Warrant Clause and the Reasonableness
Clause of the Fourth Amendment and suggesting a working model for the Fourth
Amendment "to meet its interpretational challenges").
23. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality opinion)
(determining if a seizure has occurred by asking whether "in view of all of the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he
was not free to leave"); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (creating the current two-prong test as to what constitutes a search); Lewis R.
Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-first Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549, 554-
55 (1990) (arguing for a two-tiered approach to Fourth Amendment protection from
government searches to protect invasions of privacy in today's technologically advanced
society); Wayne R. LaFave, Pinguitudinous Police, Pachydermatous Prey: Whence Fourth
Amendment "Seizures"?, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 729, 762-64 (arguing for the Court to return
to its earlier holdings, which provided greater protection of citizens from police seizures of
persons).
24. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 20, § 1.2 at 24 (citing commentators that question the
"validity and efficacy of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule").
25. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-85 (1980) (discussing the history of the
Fourth Amendment). The Court states "that the principles reflected in the [Fourth]
Amendment... 'apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employ[ees]
of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life."' Id. at 585 (quoting Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
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privacy rights of an individual against the interests of the law
enforcement community in crime prevention and safety.
2 6
In the field of warrantless police action, the line between reasonable
and unreasonable searches is not always easily determined by the
"'hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer "engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime .... 27 In addition,
government prosecutors' role in the criminal justice system of pursuing
convictions may taint their objectivity in assessing the reasonableness of
a search. 28 Therefore, due to the difficulty and importance in
determining the "unreasonable" line, the Supreme Court has insisted
upon the role of the "neutral and detached judicial officer" in passing
upon the legality of a government search.29
B. The Role of the Neutral and Detached Judge in Providing Fourth
Amendment Protection
In Johnson v. United States,30 the Supreme Court recognized the
importance of the independent judiciary in preserving Fourth
Amendment rights.31 The police officers in that case responded to a
report that someone was smoking opium in a hotel. 32 The smell of opium
led the police to the defendant's room." The police officers knocked on
the door, and after the defendant allowed them in the room, the police
officers arrested her and searched the hotel room.34
26. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968) ("[F]or there is 'no ready test for
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] [by a
police officer] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails."' (second and
fourth alterations in original) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-37
(1967))).
27. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326 (1979) (citation omitted) (quoting
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)).
28. See Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 348 (1972) (citing Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), and Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960))
(noting that warrants must be issued by "someone independent of the police and
prosecution"); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-50 (1971) (holding as invalid
a search warrant issued by the State Attorney General because he was the chief
prosecutor in the case and, therefore, did not satisfy the requirement of a neutral and
detached judge). In addition, the Supreme Court stated the prosecution's decision to file
an information "standing alone [does not] meet[] the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,117 (1975).
29. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc., 442 U.S. at 326 (citing Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 9).
30. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
31. Id. at 13-14.
32. Id. at 12.
33. Id. Since the police officers were narcotic agents and opium has a "distinctive and
unmistakable" smell, they were able to identify the opium burning in the hotel. Id.
34. Id. The search of the room turned up opium and drug smoking apparatus. Id.
The search was not justifiable as a search incident to arrest because the police officers did
[Vol. 55:473
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The Supreme Court acknowledged that the officers most likely
possessed enough evidence to obtain a search warrant from a
magistrate." Yet, the Court did not believe that such a post-search
determination was sufficient to justify the warrantless search of the
room. 36 Holding the search unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment, the Court stated that "[t]he point of the Fourth
Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it
denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring
that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
",37
Since Johnson, the Court has given police officers wide discretion to
search without a warrant.18 Acknowledging the realities and dangers of
police work, in many instances the Supreme Court has relied solely on
the Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment to judge the
constitutionality of police action. 39 However, even though the
prominence of the Warrant Clause and its search warrant requirement
has diminished,4 Johnson's insistence on the presence of a bulwark
between police officers and citizens persists. 41 After the Court
not have probable cause to arrest the defendant until they unlawfully entered the room
and determined she was the sole occupant. Id. at 16-17. The arrest was therefore
unlawful. Id.
35. Id. at 13.
36. Id. at 14. The Court rejected the notion that warrantless searches are valid if they
are based on police officers' assumptions "that [they possess] evidence sufficient to
support a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant" because it
would "reduce the [Fourth] Amendment to a nullity." Id.
37. Id. at 13-14.
38. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) ("[Wle deal here with an entire rubric of
police conduct ... which historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be,
subjected to the warrant procedure."); JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 18.01, at 292 (3d ed. 2002) (identifying Terry v. Ohio as the Supreme Court
case where police conduct began to be judged not on the basis of "'whether it is
reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable"' (quoting
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950)).
39. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 30 (holding that the need for an officer to take "swift
action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations . . . on the beat" to protect himself
and others justifies a limited search when "tested by the Fourth Amendment's general
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures"); Sundby, supra note 22, at 395
(viewing Terry v. Ohio as a case that "provided reasonableness an even greater role as an
independent factor in fourth amendment analysis").
40. See DRESSLER, supra note 38, § 18.01, at 292-93 (explaining how the Supreme
Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio made warrantless police action much easier to justify).
41. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31 (allowing limited warrantless searches and seizures by
police officers for the officer's protection, as long as such police conduct is ultimately
rendered reasonable by a judge). The Court stated:
2006]
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established the importance of the neutral and detached judicial official
for the enforcement of the Fourth Amendment, an issue developed over
when a judge should scrutinize the warrantless conduct of a police
officer.42
C. The Timeliness of Judicial Review of Warrantless Police Arrests
In Gerstein v. Pugh,43 the Supreme Court recognized the importance of
a prompt judicial review when the warrantless conduct of a police officer
results in the extended imprisonment of an individual."a In that case, two
men, Pugh and Henderson, filed a class action after they were arrested
and detained in prison without any preliminary determination of
probable cause by an independent judge 45 Under the state system in
which they were held, no judicial determination as to the probable cause
for an arrest was required until thirty days after the arrest.46 As a result,
after a person was arrested without a warrant, he "could be detained for
a substantial period solely on the decision of a prosecutor. ' ,47 The
plaintiffs requested declaratory and injunctive relief, basing their claim
on a purported constitutional right to a prompt judicial hearing to decide
whether probable cause existed for their arrest and detention.
48
[T]he police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [an]
intrusion. The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only
when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing
the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who
must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the
particular circumstances.
Id. at 21 (footnote omitted). In addition, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized
"that both state and federal interpretations of the 4th Amendment require a warrant to be
issued by a 'neutral and detached magistrate,' because . . . there is a requirement of 'an
independent determination of probable cause."' Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d
887, 905 (Pa. 1991) (citations omitted).
42. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 123-25 (1975).
43. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
44. Id. at 125. This case involved a warrantless arrest, an imprisoned defendant, and
the requisite judicial determination of probable cause. See id. at 105 & n.i. The case does
not mention warrantless searches and judicial review of their "unreasonableness";
however, the rationale of the Court's opinion in Gerstein may easily apply to such Fourth
Amendment conduct. See infra Part III.A.
45. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 105-07. Pugh was charged "with robbery, carrying a
concealed weapon, and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony." Id. at 105
n.1. He was denied bail because conviction on one of the charges could have resulted in a
life sentence. Id. at 105. Henderson was charged with "breaking and entering and assault
and battery." Id. at 105 n.1. He was granted bail, but could not post the required $4500
bond. Id. at 105.
46. See id. at 106.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 106-07.
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The Court began its analysis in Gerstein by acknowledging the
demands of law enforcement. 49 However, the Court also limited the
authority of police officers by reiterating the importance of the neutral
and detached magistrate in affording Fourth Amendment protection.50
In particular, the Court emphasized the need for an unbiased judge to
scrutinize a warrantless arrest before an individual should be required to
spend long periods of time behind bars.5' The Court observed that
"[o]nce the suspect is in custody ... the reasons that justify dispensing
with the magistrate's neutral judgment evaporate. . . . And, while the
State's reasons for taking summary action subside, the suspect's need for
a neutral determination of probable cause increases significantly."52 The
Court concluded that a prolonged detention of a suspect, arrested
without a warrant and held without a timely determination of probable
cause by a judicial official, could be an unreasonable seizure under the
Fourth Amendment.5 3 Therefore, federal and state criminal justice
systems must require a "fair and reliable determination of probable
cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty ... by
a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest.,
54
The Court's decision then outlined the "adversary safeguards" that are
constitutionally required for a Gerstein probable cause hearing.5 5 The
Court deemed the full range of rights available to a defendant at trial as
49. Id. at 112 (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)). Due to the
many unexpected circumstances that confront police officers on the beat, the Court stated
it would not invalidate an arrest supported by probable cause because a police officer
failed to receive prior judicial approval. Id. at 113.
50. Id. at 112-13.
51. Id. at 114.
52. Id. at 114. The Court expanded upon the negative impact the detention has on
the suspect and his interests, explaining that "[t]he consequences of prolonged detention
may be more serious than the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial confinement may
imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family
relationships. Even pretrial release may be accompanied by burdensome conditions that
effect a significant restraint of liberty." Id. (citations omitted); see also Thies v. State, 189
N.W. 539, 541 (Wis. 1922). In explaining the purpose of a preliminary hearing, the Thies
court emphasized the protection of personal privacy interests:
The object or purpose of the preliminary investigation is to prevent hasty,
malicious, improvident, and oppressive prosecutions, to protect the person
charged from open and public accusations of crime, to avoid both for the
defendant and the public the expense of a public trial, and to save the defendant
from the humiliation and anxiety involved in public prosecution, and to discover
whether or not there are substantial grounds upon which a prosecution may be
based.
Id.
53. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 116-17, 125.
54. See id. at 125 (footnote omitted).
55. Id. at 119-23.
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56
not necessary for a probable cause hearing. The Court justified the
need for fewer protections for a defendant "by the lesser consequences
of a probable cause determination [and] by the nature of the
determination itself., 57 Also, the Court wanted to broadly construe the
requirements for a Gerstein hearing because it "recognize[d] the
desirability of flexibility and experimentation by the States" in their
development of criminal procedures.5 8
In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,59 the Court clarified Gerstein's
timing requirement of "prompt" judicial examination of the existence of
probable cause for a warrantless arrest that leads to imprisonment.'
McLaughlin involved a class action suit that contested Riverside
County's policy of "combining probable cause determinations with its
arraignment procedures., 6' The plaintiffs alleged that this policy violated
the prompt probable cause determination required by Gerstein since
judicial review of warrantless detention was often delayed as long as five
days.62
The Court reiterated the tension in Gerstein between a state's interest
in effective law enforcement and a suspect's interest in personal freedom
and privacy.63 And even though Gerstein required the states to hold
prompt probable cause hearings, federalism concerns necessitated giving
56. Id. at 119-20. The probable cause hearing serves a fixed purpose-determination
of pretrial custody-and is not a "'critical stage' in the prosecution." Id. at 122. Because
the probable cause determination is limited in function and non-adversarial in nature, the
Court held that the right to counsel does not apply to such a hearing. Id.
57. Id. at 121-22. The Court contrasted the requirements of a trial with those of a
probable cause hearing. Id. A probable cause hearing does not involve the "resolution of
conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands,
and credibility determinations are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence
supports a reasonable belief in guilt." Id. at 121. In addition, the Court questioned the
need for confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses at a probable cause hearing.
Id. at 121-22; see also DRESSLER, supra note 38, § 1.03[C][2], at 7 ("Because a so-called
'Gerstein hearing' serves as a post-arrest equivalent of a pre-arrest warrant-application
hearing, the proceeding may be conducted in the same manner as a warrant hearing ......
(footnote omitted)).
58. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 123.
59. 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
60. Id. at 47, 56.
61. Id. at 47.
62. Id. at 47-48. The county policy required probable cause arraignments for
warrantless arrests to be conducted "without unnecessary delay and, in any event, within
two days of arrest." Id. at 47. The two day requirement, however, excluded weekends and
holidays. Id. As a result, "an individual arrested without a warrant late in the week may
in some cases be held for as long as five days before receiving a probable cause
determination." Id.
63. See id. at 52 (comparing a state's interest in the protection of the public from
individuals engaged in crime with an individual's privacy interest in not being wrongly
detained in jail).
[Vol. 55:473
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flexibility to the states in fulfilling this mandate.64 The Court, however,
felt it was necessary "to articulate more clearly the boundaries of what is
permissible under the Fourth Amendment., 6' Therefore, the Court held
that "a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable
cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the
promptness requirement of Gerstein.,66 Although the forty-eight hour
requirement was the outer limit of a permissible probable cause hearing,
the Court determined forty-eight hours provided the states with
sufficient time to incorporate a probable cause hearing with other
pretrial proceedings and thereby maintain flexibility.67
Gerstein and McLaughlin established the timetable for the mandatory
judicial determination of the existence of probable cause for a
68
warrantless arrest that leads to imprisonment. Although neither case
explicitly states it, jurisdictions require a suspect's release from prison if
probable cause is not established at a Gerstein hearing.69 On the other
hand, when police officers conduct a warrantless search that leads to
imprisonment, a judge reviews the search's legality only upon a
defendant's request.70 In addition, the Supreme Court has not weighed in
64. Id. at 53. States needed to comply with the "prompt" requirement of Gerstein,
but the Court did not want to impose a fixed scheme on the states. Id. The Court further
stated that each state had a unique criminal justice system and "individual States may
choose to comply in different ways." Id.
65. Id. at 56.
66. Id. However, a Gerstein hearing that occurs within forty-eight hours will be found
unconstitutional "if the arrested individual can prove that his or her probable cause
determination was delayed unreasonably." Id. When a Gerstein hearing is held after the
forty-eight hour window, the government has the burden "to demonstrate the existence of
a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance." Id. at 57.
67. See id. at 57-58. But see id. at 66-69 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the
Gerstein premise but disagreeing with the forty-eight hour requirement). In his dissent,
Justice Scalia argued that the states should receive no accommodation in the timing of the
probable cause hearing for the sake of flexibility. Id. at 64-65. According to Justice Scalia,
"prompt" means no longer than twenty-four hours, otherwise an "unreasonable seizure"
has taken place. Id. at 70.
68. Id. at 56 (majority opinion); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975). See
generally Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (establishing that probable
cause to arrest exists "where 'the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge
and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being
committed" (alterations in original) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162
(1925))).
69. See, e.g., PA. R. CRIM. P. 540(D) ("If the defendant was arrested without a
warrant . . . unless the issuing authority makes a determination of probable cause, the
defendant shall not be detained.").
70. Id. R. 581 cmt. ("[F]ailure to file the motion within the appropriate time limit
constitutes a waiver of the right to suppress."). A defendant must actively assert his
Fourth Amendment rights if he wishes to obtain relief from a warrantless search that
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on the timing of such a review for an imprisoned suspect.7" Regardless of
the timing of the review, the remedy for an illegal warrantless search is
the exclusion of the illegally obtained evidence from the prosecution of
the one searched.72 Without such a remedy for illegal searches, the
Fourth Amendment would be no more than "a form of words.,
73
D. The Exclusionary Rule Remedy Applied by a Neutral and Detached
Judge
The exclusionary rule entered Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with
the Supreme Court decision of Boyd v. United States;74 however, it was in
Weeks v. United States75 that the exclusionary rule was recognized as the
remedy for federal violations of the Fourth Amendment.76 Then, in
violates those rights. 5 LAFAVE, supra note 20, § 11.1, at 2-3. Therefore, the courts do not
act sua sponte to adjudicate the merits of a warrantless search; rather, any judicial review
of a warrantless search occurs only if a defendant files an appropriate motion seeking such
action. See id. And although the defendant's motion must be timely, "it may generally be
said that in the great majority of jurisdictions an objection comes too late if it is made for
the first time at the trial; a motion to suppress must be made and adequately pursued at
some pretrial stage." Id. § 11.1(a) (footnote omitted). Contra Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114
("[W]e hold that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable
cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest."). The procedure
outlined in Gerstein requires the neutral and detached magistrate to automatically review
the merits of a warrantless arrest that leads to imprisonment. See id. at 114-15.
71. A reason for the lack of Supreme Court precedent concerning the timing of
judicial review of a warrantless search is that the "wrong condemned by the Amendment
is 'fully accomplished' by the unlawful search or seizure itself and [judicial review and the
application of the exclusionary rule cannot] 'cure the invasion of the defendant's rights
which he has already suffered."' United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (quoting
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976) (White, J. dissenting)). However, when a
defendant is incarcerated as a result of an illegal warrantless search, the imprisonment
itself can be categorized as an ongoing unreasonable seizure and the "fully accomplished
wrong" rationale should not apply. See infra Part III.A.
72. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 20, § 1.6, at 155-56 (outlining how, procedurally,
evidence illegally obtained by law enforcement is excluded from introduction at trial).
73. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920) (discussing
the importance of prohibiting the government from benefiting from any use of illegally
obtained evidence if the Fourth Amendment is to have any bite).
74. 116 U.S. 616, 630-33 (1886).
75. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
76. See id. at 393, 398. The Court held that the introduction into evidence of letters
taken from the defendant's house by a federal marshal in violation of the Fourth
Amendment resulted in "prejudicial error." Id. at 398. The Court, after reviewing the
history of the Fourth Amendment, stated that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment was
to limit the authority of the courts and law enforcement officials and, in the process,
protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 391-92. Specifically, the
Court stated that "[t]his protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and
the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under our Federal
system with the enforcement of the laws." Id. at 392. The Court did not think the
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Mapp v. Ohio," the exclusionary remedy for Fourth Amendment
violations became applicable to the states-"[t]o hold otherwise is to
grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment.
Mapp articulated two main rationale supporting the exclusionary
rule. 79 First, the suppression of illegally obtained evidence provides a
"deterrent safeguard without insistence upon which the Fourth
Amendment would have been reduced to a 'form of words.', 8 0  As
applied in later cases, the rule's deterrent purpose is aimed at illegal law
enforcement conduct."' Second, judicial integrity requires the application
judiciary, in its role as defender of the Constitution, should permit convictions based upon
police conduct that violated the Constitution. Id.
77. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
78. Id. at 655-56. The Court held in its previous decision of Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655, that the guarantees of the Fourth
Amendment were constitutional rights that individuals enjoyed against the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 27-28. However, the Wolf
Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule to the states. Id. at 28-29. The Mapp Court
viewed things differently. According to Mapp, the Fourth Amendment rights "could not
consistently tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the
exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the
unlawful seizure." Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656. Mapp recognized the exclusionary rule as a
constitutional guarantee of the Fourth Amendment and made it enforceable against the
states. Id. at 655. The Court believed that its decision in Mapp had "close[d] the only
courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant
abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very
same unlawful conduct." Id. at 654-55.
79. Mapp, 367 at 648, 659; see also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that the exclusionary rule serves a purpose "of
assuring the people-all potential victims of unlawful government conduct-that the
government would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of
seriously undermining popular trust in government").
80. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648 (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385, 392 (1920)).
81. See, e.g., Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998) (defining the
exclusionary rule as "a judicially created means of deterring illegal searches and seizures"
(citing Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348)); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (stating
that the Court "has established that the 'prime purpose' of the [exclusionary] rule, if not
the sole one, 'is to deter future unlawful police conduct' (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at
347)); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968) (discussing the admissibility of evidence and
acknowledging that "[e]ver since its inception, the rule excluding evidence seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment has been recognized as a principal mode of
discouraging lawless police conduct").
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of the exclusionary rule." Judges cannot allow police to benefit from
violations of the very law that judges are entrusted to uphold.83
In United States v. Calandra, 8 the Supreme Court severed the
exclusionary rule from any constitutional basis. 85 The Court decreed that
the exclusionary rule is a judicial remedy and not an absolute
constitutional guarantee." As a remedy, a balancing test could be used
to determine if the exclusionary rule applies to a particular criminal
proceeding. 87 And in effectuating this balancing test, the exclusionary
rule's only purpose is "to deter future unlawful police conduct."
88
In Calandra, John Calandra was summoned to testify before a grand
jury." The government planned to question Calandra regarding evidence
it had obtained from a search of his workplace.90 Before he testified,
Calandra filed and won a motion suppressing the evidence seized from
82. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659; see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23
(1960) (asserting that the judicial acts of admitting and excluding evidence from trial are
the equivalent of deeming the police conduct that acquired the evidence constitutional and
unconstitutional, respectively).
83. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659. The Court considered a judge that permits a police
officer to use illegally obtained evidence to convict a known criminal to be a greater threat
to liberty than setting a criminal free. Id. The Court believed that "[n]othing can destroy
a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws." Id.
84. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
85. Id. at 348.
86. Id.
87. Id. The Court compared the exclusionary remedy with other remedial devices
and restricted its use "to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most
efficaciously served." Id.
88. Id. at 347. The Court dismissed the "judicial integrity" purpose in a footnote by
stating that "'illegal conduct' is hardly sanctioned, nor are the foundations of the Republic
imperiled, by declining to make an unprecedented extension of the exclusionary rule ...
where the rule's objectives would not be effectively served and where other . . . values
would be unduly prejudiced." Id. at 356 n.l. A footnote in United States v. Janis, 428
U.S. 433 (1976), fully sheds light on why "judicial integrity" has been relegated to
dissenting opinions and footnote status as a motivating purpose for the exclusionary rule:
The primary meaning of "judicial integrity" in the context of evidentiary
rules is that the courts must not commit or encourage violations of the
Constitution. In the Fourth Amendment area, however, the evidence is
unquestionably accurate, and the violation is complete by the time the evidence
is presented to the court. The focus therefore must be on the question whether
the admission of the evidence encourages violations of Fourth Amendment
rights. As the Court has noted in recent cases, this inquiry is essentially the same
as the inquiry into whether exclusion would serve a deterrent purpose.
Id. at 458 n.35 (citation omitted).
89. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 341.
90. Id.
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his office. 9' Calandra notified the government that he would not answer
any questions before the grand jury based on information obtained from
92the search of his workplace. The district court and the Sixth Circuit
upheld Calandra's refusal to testify and it applied the exclusionary rule to
the grand jury proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed.94
The Court delineated the purpose of the exclusionary rule as one of
prevention.95 According to the Court, the rule serves as a "deter[rent] to
future unlawful police conduct" and a "safeguard [of] Fourth
Amendment rights. 96 The ability of the rule to deter illegal searches,
however, determines the limit of its use.97 So the Court adopted a
balancing test to determine when to apply the exclusionary rule in a
given criminal proceeding.9" In this test, the exclusionary rule's deterrent
effect on illegal police action is balanced against the cost to the public of
excluding probative evidence in the prosecution of crime. 99 Deterrence,
and thus exclusion, weighs heaviest when "the Government's unlawful
conduct would result in imposition of a criminal sanction on the victim of
the search."
1 °°
The Calandra Court weighed the harm to the functioning of the grand
jury against any increased deterrent effect on unlawful police conduct. °
It held that the impairment to the grand jury system far exceeded any
additional deterrent effect created by broadening the exclusionary rule's
91. Id. The district court suppressed the evidence found at Calandra's workplace on
the grounds "that the search warrant had been issued without probable cause and that the
search had exceeded the scope of the warrant." Id. at 342.
92. Id. at 341.
93. Id. at 341-42.
94. Id. at 342.
95. Id. at 347. Although the "judicial integrity" purpose espoused in Mapp found no
support in the majority, the dissent believed it remained an essential underlying principle
for the exclusionary rule. Id. at 355-361 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent, relying on
the words of Justice Holmes, believed "'it a less evil that some criminals should escape
than that the Government should play an ignoble part."' Id. at 358-59 (quoting Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
96. Id. at 347-48 (majority opinion).
97. See id. at 348. As noted in a subsequent case, "[b]ecause of the inherent
trustworthiness of seized tangible evidence and the resulting social costs from its loss
through suppression, application of the exclusionary rule has been carefully 'restricted to
those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served."' Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 254-55 (1983) (White, J., concurring) (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S.
at 348).
98. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348.
99. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 254-57 (White, J., concurring).
100. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348.
101. Id. at 349-51.
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application to a grand jury proceeding.'2 The Court reasoned that
"[s]uch an extension would deter only police investigation consciously
directed toward the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand jury
investigation." 3 And the inadmissibility of such evidence at a criminal
trial sufficiently deterred any motivation the police possessed to
disregard the Fourth Amendment in order to secure a grand jury
indictment."'a Therefore, the Court held that the exclusionary rule does
not apply to grand jury proceedings. 5
The Calandra rationale and balancing test have guided the Court's
application of the exclusionary rule in various proceedings.•' 6 However,
due to the inability to collect empirical evidence measuring the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule, it is difficult to measure the effectiveness
of the rule's implementation.' 7 The Court has "relied, instead, on its
own assumptions of human nature and the interrelationship of the
various components of the law enforcement system" to determine
102. Id. The Court emphasized that the role of the grand jury in the criminal justice
system is not the adjudication of guilt or innocence. Id. at 349. Rather, the grand jury is
an investigative body not subject to the evidentiary rules of a trial. Id. By allowing
Calandra and others to use the exclusionary rule in grand jury proceedings, the grand jury
would turn into a mini-trial and would "halt the orderly progress of an investigation." Id.
at 349-50. In addition, suppression hearings for a grand jury proceeding "might
necessitate extended litigation of issues only tangentially related to the grand jury's
primary objective." Id. at 349.
103. Id. at 351.
104. Id. The Court also stated that the prosecutor himself provided another safeguard
to prevent police violations of the Fourth Amendment motivated by obtaining a grand
jury indictment. Id. In particular, "a prosecutor would be unlikely to request an
indictment where a conviction could not be obtained." Id.
105. Id. at 354. Although the Court acknowledged the "[s]uppression of the use of
illegally seized evidence against the search victim in a criminal trial [as] ... an important
method of effectuating the Fourth Amendment," the Court refused to hold that the
Fourth Amendment required application of the exclusionary rule to all proceedings or
situations that may deter police misconduct. Id. at 350.
106. See, e.g., Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 359, 369 (1998) (holding
that the exclusionary rule does not apply to parole revocation hearings and therefore,
evidence obtained from a parolee in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights is
admissible); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-22 (1984) (holding that the
exclusionary rule does not apply when a "good faith" violation of the Fourth Amendment
occurs); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1034, 1043 (1984) (holding that the
exclusionary rule does not apply in deportation proceedings because its "deterrent value"
is "significantly reduce[d]"); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459-60 (1976) (holding
that the exclusionary rule does not apply to federal civil tax proceedings when the
evidence in question was obtained by a state law enforcement officer).
107. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 259-60 (1983) (White, J., concurring) ("The
deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule has never been established by empirical evidence,
despite repeated attempts."); 1 LAFAVE, supra note 20, § 1.2(b), at 29 (citing various
studies and Supreme Court opinions to support the conclusion that "it has not been clearly
established that the exclusionary rule does deter, or that it does not").
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questions of exclusion and deterrence under the Fourth Amendment. 8
Therefore, despite the lack of empirical evidence to support the notion
that the exclusion of illegally seized evidence curtails illegal police
conduct, the Court has held that the exclusionary rule is best served
when illegally obtained evidence is inadmissible at trial.' °
Several states' use of the exclusionary rule has exceeded the deterrent
purpose of Calandra."° For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has recognized "'its exclusionary rule [as] grounded in the protection of
privacy'"" and "use[s] the rule to remedy present violations of individual
privacy rights.""' 2 Therefore, in Pennsylvania's criminal proceedings, its
exclusionary rule, grounded in its state constitution, serves to safeguard
the privacy of its citizens and surpasses the protections of Calandra." '
108. Janis, 428 U.S. at 459.
109. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976) (discussing the Court's assumption
that the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence at trial will deter police misconduct "by
removing the incentive to disregard [the Fourth Amendment]"); Calandra, 414 U.S. at
348.
110. See Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 899-901 (Pa. 1991) (noting the
different applications of the "good-faith" exception to the exclusionary rule by various
state high courts under their respective state constitutions). State courts are allowed to
interpret their state constitutions independent of the United States Constitution. Id. at
894. States "are free to reject the conclusions of the United States Supreme Court so long
as [they] remain faithful to the minimum guarantees [of individual freedom that the
Supreme Court has recognized as] established by the United States Constitution." Id. at
895.
111. Commonwealth v. Hughes, 836 A.2d 893, 902 (Pa. 2003) (quoting Commonwealth
v. Williams, 692 A.2d 1031, 1038 (Pa. 1997)).
112. In re B.C., 683 A.2d 919, 929 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996), appeal granted, 734 A.2d 392
(Pa. 1998), appeal dismissed, 754 A.2d 665 (Pa. 2000).
113. See Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 888, 897-99 (holding that the "'good faith' exception to
the exclusionary rule as articulated by the United States Supreme Court in the case of
United States v. Leon .... frustrate[s] the guarantees embodied in . . . the Pennsylvania
Constitution" (citation omitted)). In Edmunds, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected
the U.S. Supreme Court's use of the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule to justify
the "good faith" exception in Leon:
Whether the United States Supreme Court has determined that the
exclusionary rule does not advance the 4th Amendment purpose of deterring
police conduct is irrelevant .... What is significant, however, is that our [state]
Constitution has historically been interpreted to incorporate a strong right of
privacy .... Citizens in this Commonwealth possess such rights, even where a
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E. Pennsylvania Criminal Procedures"4
Pennsylvania, its state constitution, and its Rules of Criminal
Procedure provide a framework to explore the previously discussed
facets of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment and its
protections are applicable to Pennsylvania through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."5 In addition, Pennsylvania's
own state constitution provides nearly the identical protection as the
Fourth Amendment."' However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
interpreted the language of its state constitution to grant greater
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than the
protection the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged is
required under the Fourth Amendment.' 7 In reviewing the legality of a
search under the Pennsylvania Constitution, Pennsylvania state judges
will give added weight to the rights of the individual when they are
balanced against the needs of law enforcement. " "
114. For the purpose of Section E, it is worthwhile to view how an individual, we will
call him Matt, arrested and imprisoned as a result of an illegal warrantless search, will
experience the Fourth Amendment protections of the Pennsylvania system. We will
assume that Matt has been charged with a crime more serious than a misdemeanor of the
second degree, since the arresting officer may release from custody a defendant who has
been arrested without a warrant and charged with no offense more serious than a
misdemeanor of the second degree. PA. R. CRIM. P. 519(B).
115. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
116. PA. CONST. art. I, § 8. Like the Fourth Amendment, the Pennsylvania provision
consists of a Reasonableness Clause and Warrant Clause. Id. Since this Comment is
concerned with warrantless searches, the Reasonableness Clause and its language are as
follows: "The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from
unreasonable searches and seizures .... " Id.
117. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 698 A.2d 571, 573 (Pa. 1997) ("The protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the Pennsylvania Constitution is
broader than that under the federal Constitution." (citing Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887
(1991))). It is worth noting that a state can give its citizens greater protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures than the Federal Constitution and the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Constitution, but never less. Id.
118. See In re B.C., 683 A.2d 919, 926-27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (comparing the
Pennsylvania courts' application of the state constitution with the federal courts'
application of the federal constitution, in the realm of searches and seizures, and finding
that the Pennsylvania courts "'mandate[] [a] greater need for protection from illegal
government conduct offensive to the right of privacy' (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Schaeffer, 536 A.2d 354, 360 (Pa. Super Ct. 1987))), appeal granted, 734
A.2d 392 (Pa. 1998), appeal dismissed, 754 A.2d 665 (Pa. 2000). The Pennsylvania
Superior Court acknowledged that both federal and state courts, in their prevention of
unreasonable searches and seizures, "seek[] to strike the appropriate balance between
preserving the privacy interests of citizens and permitting law enforcement officials to act
without hamstringing restraints." Id. at 928. However, Pennsylvania courts differ from
their federal counterparts in that "[f]ederal decisions ... tend to lend greater weight to the
interests of law enforcement, while the decisions of [the] Commonwealth courts more
often emphasize the preservation of individual privacy." Id.
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1. Arrest, Preliminary Arraignment, and Preliminary Hearing"9
Once a suspect is arrested without a warrant, based on a warrantless
search, a complaint will be filed against the suspect.120 The suspect will
then be brought in front of the "proper issuing authority without
unnecessary delay" for a preliminary arraignment to determine if
probable cause existed for the warrantless arrest.12 The promptness of
this proceeding is required to be in compliance with the forty-eight hour
window of McLaughlin.1 22 If the neutral and detached magistrate decides
probable cause existed and the suspect cannot post bail, the suspect will
be imprisoned until the preliminary hearing three to ten days later.
12 3
The purpose of the later preliminary hearing in front of the magistrate
is for the state to establish the existence of a prima facie case against the
defendant. 124 The prosecution can present any "legally competent"
119. Assuming the prosecution is successful at this stage and Matt is held for court,
Matt's total time spent in jail at the conclusion of a preliminary hearing will be a maximum
of twelve days. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 540(F); infra text accompanying notes 120-23.
However, Matt's warrantless search will not be reviewed by an independent judge during
this time. See infra note 126 and accompanying text. The twelve day timeline assumes
that no continuances have been granted.
120. PA. R. CRIM. P. 519(A)(1).
121. Id. The preliminary arraignment is Pennsylvania's answer to the Gerstein
hearing. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 125 (1975) ("[J]udicial determination of
probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest"). The
preliminary arraignment serves several functions. In addition to determining probable
cause, the issuing authority will read the charges against the defendant and advise him of
his rights. PA. R. CRIM. P. 540(E). The charges filed against the defendant are contained
within the complaint. Id. R. 503-504. The rights to which the defendant is entitled are the
right to his own or appointed counsel and the right to a preliminary hearing. Id. R.
540(E). Bail, if available, is also set at the preliminary arraignment. Id. Finally, unless
waived, the issuing authority will set a date for a preliminary hearing that is not "less than
3 nor more than 10 days after the preliminary arraignment." Id. R. 540(F). In addition,
the "issuing authority" satisfies the Gerstein and Fourth Amendment requirement of a
neutral and detached judicial official. Compare id. R. 103 (defining "issuing authority" for
purposes of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure), with Shadwick v. City of
Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 348-50 (1972) (defining the requirements of a magistrate for Fourth
Amendment purposes).
122. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 540(D) cmt.; County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44,
56 (1991).
123. PA. R. CRIM. P. 540(F)(1), (G). Under the rules, "[a]fter the preliminary
arraignment, if the defendant is detained, the defendant shall be given an immediate and
reasonable opportunity to post bail .... [I]f the defendant does not post bail, he or she
shall be committed to jail as provided by law." Id. R. 540(G).
124. Id. R. 543(A). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has noted:
The preliminary hearing is not a trial. The principal function of a preliminary
hearing is to protect an individual's right against an unlawful arrest and
detention. At this hearing the Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing
at least a prima facie case that a crime has been committed and that the accused
is probably the one who committed it .... In order to meet its burden at the
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evidence to establish the prima facie case."' An objection by the
defendant that the evidence offered by the prosecution is the result of an
illegal search will usually fail.126 Therefore, the prosecution will be able
to create its prima facie case, and keep the defendant in prison, based on
evidence that could later be held inadmissible because it was obtained in
violation of the defendant's constitutional rights. If the prosecution
"establishes a prima facie case of the defendant's guilt," the defendant
will be imprisoned until his later formal arraignment in the trial court,
1281
unless he meets bail. If the prosecution fails to meet its burden, thedefendant will be released and the charges will be dismissed.129
preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth is required to present evidence with
regard to each of the material elements of the charge and to establish sufficient
probable cause to warrant the belief that the accused committed the offense.
Commonwealth v. McBride, 595 A.2d 589, 591 (Pa. 1991) (citations omitted).
125. See Commonwealth ex rel. Buchanan v. Verbonitz, 581 A.2d 172, 174 (Pa. 1990).
Pennsylvania does not consider the weight or credibility of evidence offered at the
preliminary hearing. Commonwealth v. Wojdak, 466 A.2d 991, 997 (Pa. 1983); see also
Liciaga v. Court of Common Pleas, 566 A.2d 246, 248 (Pa. 1989) ("The committing
magistrate is precluded from considering the credibility of a witness who is called upon to
testify during the preliminary hearing." (citing Wojdak, 466 A.2d 991)). And hearsay
evidence can be relied upon to establish a prima facie case, but it cannot be the sole basis
for holding a defendant for trial. Commonwealth v. Carmody, 799 A.2d. 143, 146 n.2 (Pa.
2002).
126. Interview with Benjamin Traud, Assistant Dist. Att'y, Lehigh County, Pa., in
Allentown, Pa. (Sept. 22, 2004); see also supra note 125 and accompanying text. The
prosecution will successfully argue discovery has not yet occurred and admissibility is an
issue for the suppression hearing. Interview with Benjamin Traud, supra; see also FED. R.
CRIM. P. 5.1(e) ("At the preliminary hearing, the defendant may cross-examine adverse
witnesses and may introduce evidence but may not object to evidence on the ground that
it was unlawfully acquired.").
127. See infra Part II.E.4.
128. PA. R. CRIM. P. 543(B)-(C). If the issuing authority already set bail, the amount
can be modified at this time. Id. R. 543(C)(2). It is worth noting that at the preliminary
hearing a defendant can enter a guilty plea for certain charges. Id. R. 550(A). The offense
charged must be one which, by statute, grants the district judge, "the issuing authority" or
magistrate in Pennsylvania, the power to exercise such jurisdiction. Id. In order to accept
the guilty plea, the district judge must determine that the plea is voluntary. Id. R. 550(B).
The district judge should inquire into the voluntariness of the guilty plea, much like a trial
judge. Id. R. 550(B) & cmt.; see also infra notes 162-53 and accompanying text (describing
the "colloquy" a trial judge should undertake to determine the voluntariness of a guilty
plea). Most of the guilty pleas at this stage are a result of a plea agreement between the
prosecution and the defendant. Interview with Benjamin Traud, supra note 126. The
defendant is able to leave jail and the prosecution is able to lighten its caseload of a minor
offense. Id. However, when a plea agreement is used, an independent judge does not
review the merits of any warrantless search. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
129. PA. R. CRIM. P. 543(B).
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2. Information and Arraignment3 0
The Pennsylvania state criminal justice system is an "information
jurisdiction" as opposed to an "indictment jurisdiction.""' Therefore,
when the case is "bound over" at the preliminary hearing, it is sent to the
trial court and not a grand jury.12 The Commonwealth attorney, that is,
the district attorney, is responsible for preparing an information and
filing it with the appropriate county court to institute the trialt. 133
proceedings. This filing process will often take in excess of a month to
complete. 14 Within ten days of the district attorney filing the
information, an arraignment will be conducted in open court, unless the
defendant waives the proceeding.13 The purpose of the arraignment is to
advise the defendant of his charges, to have the defendant provide an
answer to the charges, to ensure the defendant is aware of his right to
130. If the prosecution establishes a prima facie case and bail is not met, Matt could sit
an additional fifty days in jail waiting for his arraignment. See infra text accompanying
notes 132-35. At his arraignment, he will be in front of a neutral and detached judge, but
no determination will be made as to the legality of the warrantless search that placed him
in jail. See infra text accompanying note 136. His total number of days in jail at the
conclusion of his arraignment will be sixty-two days. See supra note 119.
131. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 560. In an information jurisdiction, "[a] formal criminal
charge [is] made by a prosecutor without a grand-jury indictment." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 783 (7th ed. 1999). In an indictment jurisdiction, "[t]he formal written
accusation of a crime [is] made by a grand jury and presented to a court for prosecution
against the accused person." Id. at 776. See generally 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL.,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.3(l)-(m), at 119-22 (2d ed. 1999) (explaining the differences
between the various state criminal justice systems). After the preliminary hearing, a
criminal case will usually follow one of two routes:
If the magistrate concludes that the evidence presented establishes probable
cause, he will "bind the case over" to the next stage in the proceedings. In an
indictment jurisdiction, the case is boundover to the grand jury, and in a
jurisdiction that permits the direct filing of an information, the case is boundover
directly to the general trial court.
Id. § 1.3(l) (citations omitted).
132. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 543(B), 560(A).
133. Id. R. 560.
134. Telephone Interview with Kelly L. Banach, Judge, Court of Common Pleas,
Criminal Div., Lehigh County, Pa. (Nov. 4, 2004). Local court rules will determine this
time requirement. In Lehigh County, Pennsylvania, the court rules, as determined by the
president judge, require a district attorney to file an information against a defendant
within forty days of his preliminary hearing. Id. This has recently been reduced from
forty-five days. Id. The forty days allow a district attorney to be assigned to the case,
review the case, and confirm the case's merits. Id. The forty days also permit a district
attorney and the clerk's office to complete the necessary administrative steps associated
with a criminal case. Id.
135. PA. R. CRIM. P. 571. Local court rules can alter the ten day default time
requirement. Id. In addition, the court can extend the ten day window for "cause shown."
Id.
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Pennsylvania requires one "Omnibus Pretrial Motion for Relief."'38
The omnibus motion must contain all pretrial relief requests of the
defendant, including the suppression of illegally obtained evidence.'39
Unless extenuating circumstances arise, the defendant must file an
omnibus pretrial motion seeking the exclusion of evidence from trial
within thirty days of arraignment. 40 Once filed, the only time restriction
on the adjudication of the motion is that it be determined "prior to or at
trial."' 141 Pennsylvania's Rules of Criminal Procedure guarantee an
incarcerated defendant the shortest wait for trial and, consequently, for a
suppression hearing. The rules dictate that all imprisoned defendants
receive a trial that will "commence no later than 180 days from the date




Once an omnibus motion is filed, the court will schedule a hearing to
136. Id. R. 571 cmt. Local court rules determine the "form and manner" of the
arraignment. Id. R. 571(A).
137. Matt, who may simply lack the financial wherewithal to pay bail, could legally
wait six months in prison in order to obtain a ruling on his motion that questions the
legality of the warrantless search that placed him in jail. See infra text accompayning notes
139-42.
138. PA. R. CRIM. P. 578.
139. Id. R. 578 & cmt.
140. Id. R. 579. However, the Comment following Rule 579 states: "This rule is not
intended to preclude the filing by any party of a motion prior to arraignment when
circumstances necessitate such a motion and when otherwise not precluded by rule or by
law." Id. R. 579 cmt. If a defendant fails to file an omnibus motion, he will have waived
his right to contest and suppress any evidence offered against him at trial. Id. R. 581(B) &
cmt.
141. Id. R. 581(E).
142. Id. R. 600(A)(2); cf id. R. 600(A)(3) (setting out the prompt trial requirement for
a defendant who "is at liberty on bail" as "no later than 365 days from the date on which
the complaint is filed").
143. Because Matt was subject to an illegal warrantless search, the suppression hearing
will finally vindicate him. The judge in his case will apply the exclusionary rule, the
acknowledged remedy for Fourth Amendment violations by police officers. See supra text
accompanying notes 76-78. The evidence obtained by the illegal warrantless search will be
suppressed, and the charges against him will be dropped as long as there is no other
evidence to support the state's case. See infra text accompanying notes 148-49. The
problem is that he will have to wait several months behind bars to receive this relief. See
supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
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determine the merits of any claims raised in the motion."" A suppression
hearing is held when the defendant seeks to suppress any evidence
obtained by the state in violation of the defendant's rights, in this case his
Fourth Amendment rights. 45  The state will need to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence "that the challenged evidence was not
obtained in violation of the defendant's rights." 146 If the judge
determines that the evidence was obtained in accordance with the law,
the evidence can be used against the defendant at trial. 47 If, however,
the judge concludes that the evidence was obtained in violation of the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, the evidence will be excluded
from the state's case at trial. 148 When the court renders such a decision,
the state must decide whether it has enough remaining evidence to
proceed against the defendant. 49
5. Plea Bargains1 50
Pennsylvania's criminal justice system, like most criminal justice
systems, offers defendants an alternative to the trial process to secure
their early exit from prison. Through plea bargaining, defendants can
enter a guilty plea in exchange for a favorable handling of their case by
the state. 151 However, most often, the defendant must forfeit any claim of
a Fourth Amendment search violation. 152 As a result, with a plea
144. PA. R. CRIM. P. 581(E). The Rules require the court to give the state adequate
time prior to a suppression hearing to investigate the claims contained in the motion. Id.
145. Id. R. 581.
146. Id. R. 581(H) & cmt. The state will have both the burden of production and the
burden of persuasion at a suppression hearing. Id. R. 581 cmt.
147. Id. R. 581(I)-(J). At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the judge will
enter findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether the evidence in question is
admissible at trial. Id. R. 581(I).
148. See id. R. 581(I).
149. In most drug cases, if the state loses the suppression hearing, the drugs will be
suppressed and the state will lose its only evidence. Interview with Benjamin Traud, supra
note 126. As a result, the charges will be dropped and the defendant will be released from
prison. Id.
150. Although the acceptance of a plea bargain by Matt will most likely result in his
early departure from prison, it comes at the price of a conviction on his record and no
independent determination of whether his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. See
infra text accompanying notes 151-54.
151. PA. R. CRIM. P. 590(B) & cmt.
152. The state is more likely to offer a plea agreement to a defendant prior to a
suppression hearing. Interview with Maureen Coggins, Chief Pub. Defender, Lehigh
County, Pa., in Allentown, Pa. (Sept. 22, 2004); Interview with Benjamin Traud, supra
note 126; see also infra text accompanying notes 164-67. The state may still make a plea
offer after the defendant loses at the suppression hearing; however, the offer will not be as
favorable to the defendant because the state knows that it can use the seized evidence, it is
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bargain, an independent judge will never pass judgment on the legality of
certain warrantless police conduct under the Fourth Amendment and the
exclusionary rule will never be applied.153 But plea agreements guarantee
defendants a faster conclusion to their case than the suppression hearing
route does.
15 4
The Supreme Court has recognized the vital role plea agreements play
in the criminal justice system."' In fact, the Court has made it clear that
there is nothing unconstitutional about encouraging guilty pleas. 156
Guilty pleas benefit both the state and the defendant."' At the same
more confident it will secure a conviction, and it does not have the need to seek a plea.
Interview with Maureen Coggins, supra.
153. See discussion infra Part III.B. If the plea agreement is accepted prior to the
suppression hearing, the sole opportunity for a Pennsylvania state judge to rule on the
constitutionality of a warrantless search and apply the exclusionary rule has been
eliminated. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 581. If earlier police misconduct occurred, it escapes
airing in the courtroom and the condemnation by the judge through a suppression order-
two parts of a suppression hearing that contribute to the exclusionary rule's deterrent
effect. Telephone Interview with Kelly L. Banach, supra note 134.
154. Compare supra Part I1.E.3. (requiring that the suppression hearing for an
imprisoned defendant be held no later than 180 days after a complaint is filed), with supra
Part II.E.5. (explaining the state's preference to strike plea agreements prior to a
suppression hearing).
155. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) (discussing plea agreements
as "not only an essential part of the process but a highly desirable part"). The Court listed
various benefits of plea bargaining:
It leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids
much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement
for those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the public from those
accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on
pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and disposition, it
enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they
are ultimately imprisoned.
Id.
156. See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 219 & n.9 (1978) (asserting that the
Court's case law has established that a state may encourage a guilty plea by offering
favorable treatment in return for the plea). The Court held:
"While confronting a defendant with the risk of more severe punishment
clearly may have a 'discouraging effect on the defendant's assertion of his trial
rights, the imposition of these difficult choices [is] an inevitable'-and
permissible-'attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages
the negotiation of pleas.' . . . [T]his Court has necessarily accepted as
constitutionally legitimate the simple reality that the prosecutor's interest at the
bargaining table is to persuade the defendant to forgo his right to plead not
guilty."
Id. at 220-21 (emphasis added) (first alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)).
157. See id. at 220 (explaining that a defendant derives the benefit of "a lesser penalty
than that required to be imposed after a guilty verdict by a jury" by accepting a plea
agreement); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) (detailing the advantages of a
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time, since the guilty plea results in a conviction, the defendant waives
certain constitutional trial rights."" Therefore, the defendant's waiver of
these rights and his plea of guilty must be voluntary and knowing. '59
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has addressed and accepted the role
of plea bargaining in its criminal justice system.' 6° In addition, guilty
pleas and plea agreements are covered in the Pennsylvania Rules of
Criminal Procedure.' Guilty pleas must be entered in court, and the
judge must ascertain whether the plea is "voluntarily and
plea bargain to both sides). For a defendant, "[he] avoids extended pretrial incarceration
and the anxieties and uncertainties of a trial, he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the
chance to acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in realizing whatever potential there
may be for rehabilitation." Id. And the prosecution is able to "conserve vital and scarce
resources," which it would have used in trying the case. Id.
158. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969) (discussing the function and
consequences of a guilty plea). The Court considers three federal constitutional trial
rights waived in a plea bargain: the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to
trial by jury, and the right to confrontation. Id. at 243. But see supra note 71 (discussing
the nature of the Fourth Amendment). A Fourth Amendment right is not waived when a
defendant enters a guilty plea because any violation of the Amendment has already
occurred and, therefore, no personal constitutional right exists to waive. See supra note
71. However, the Court has failed to recognize the possibility of an ongoing Fourth
Amendment violation when an incarcerated defendant's warrantless search has not been
subject to judicial review. See infra Part III.A. In addition, the Supreme Court has not
considered the effect a plea agreement, which may result in the non-application of the
exclusionary rule to a conviction based on an illegal warrantless search, has on the
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule and the Fourth Amendment. See infra Part
III.B.
159. See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28-29 (1992) (summarizing the Court's
requirements for a valid guilty plea); Commonwealth ex rel. Kerekes v. Maroney, 223 A.2d
699, 701-02 (Pa. 1966) (discussing the validity of a guilty plea and its dependence upon
whether the plea was "the defendant's own voluntary and intelligent choice"). A court, in
accepting a guilty plea derived from a plea agreement, must assess whether the
defendant's waiver of his trial rights is "'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of
a known right or privilege."' McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (quoting
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)); see also FED R. CRIM. P. 11(c). In order for
the plea to be voluntary, it is also essential that "the defendant possesses an understanding
of the law in relation to the facts." McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466.
160. See Kerekes, 223 A.2d at 703-05 (presenting the opposing views as to the merits of
plea bargaining). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that both the state and the
defendant benefit from a plea bargain system. Id. at 704. By denying the state the ability
to bargain, there would be "a substantial increase in required prosecutorial manpower and
in the number of necessary trials," although no important state interest would be served
by obtaining increased sentences. Id. As for the defendant, "the abolition of plea
bargaining might be disastrous, for there would then be little incentive for the state to
acquiesce in less than the maximum available punishment." Id. at 704-05. In the court's
opinion, "there is neither an overriding interest of society which would prohibit such
prosecutorial discretion nor must such bargaining invariably infringe upon the defendant's
constitutional rights." Id. at 705.
161. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 590.
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understandingly tendered."'6 2 As part of the judge's mandated guilty
plea inquiry, the protections of the Fourth Amendment are not
addressed-regardless if it is a warrantless search case or if the
suppression hearing has taken place.
Most plea bargains in Pennsylvania courts are reached prior to a
suppression hearing.1 6 The main reason for this timing is that plea
162. Id. R. 590(A). Similar to the requirements in Supreme Court case law, a
Pennsylvania judge must make an independent inquiry of the defendant to ascertain the
"voluntary and understandingly tendered" nature of a guilty plea. Compare supra note
159 (discussing the Supreme Court's requirements for the assessment of guilty pleas), with
PA. R. CRIM. P. 590 cmt. (discussing how Pennsylvania judges should assess guilty pleas).
The comment to Rule 590 lists the questions that, at a minimum, a judge must ask prior to
accepting a guilty plea. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Willis, 369 A.2d 1189, 1189-90 (Pa.
1977) (listing six questions a judge must ask when accepting a guilty plea). However, the
comment also notes that "[it is difficult to formulate a comprehensive list of questions a
judge must ask of a defendant in determining whether the judge should accept the plea of
guilty." PA. R. CRIM. P. 590 cmt.
163. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 590 cmt. (listing the questions a judge must ask, which do not
include inquiry into the protections of the Fourth Amendment). The comment to Rule
590 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
Court decisions may add areas to be encompassed in determining whether the
defendant understands the full impact and consequences of the plea, but is
nevertheless willing to enter that plea. At a minimum the judge should ask
questions to elicit the following information:
(1) Does the defendant understand the nature of the charges to which he or
she is pleading guilty or nolo contendere?
(2)Is there a factual basis for the plea?
(3) Does the defendant understand that he or she has the right to trial by
jury?
(4) Does the defendant understand that he or she is presumed innocent until
found guilty?
(5) Is the defendant aware of the permissible range of sentences and/or fines
for the offenses charged?
(6) Is the defendant aware that the judge is not bound by the terms of any
plea agreement tendered unless the judge accepts such agreement?
Inquiry into the above six areas is mandatory during a guilty plea colloquy.
Id. When a guilty plea is offered as part of a plea agreement, the Pennsylvania rules
require the judge to assure himself that the defendant understands and voluntarily enters
into the "terms" of the plea agreement. Id. R. 590(B)(2). The Rules define "terms" as
follows: "The [district attorney] in exchange for the defendant's plea of guilty . . .
promis[es] concessions such as a reduction of a charge to a less serious offense, the
dropping of one or more additional charges, a recommendation of a lenient sentence, or a
combination of these." Id. R. 590 cmt.; see also Commonwealth v. Porreca, 595 A.2d 23,
27 (Pa. 1991) (relying on the Supreme Court decision of Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257 (1971), and requiring the state's trial courts to ask defendants if they understand and
concur in any plea agreement).
164. Interview with Benjamin Traud, supra note 126. District attorneys prefer to
resolve cases through plea bargains before a suppression hearing is held for several
reasons, including questionable searches, caseload, and lack of confidence in the police
witness. Id.
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bargains are offered at the sole discretion of the prosecution.6 1 Once a
suppression hearing has been held and decided in the prosecution's
favor, the prosecution has little motivation to offer a defendant any
further "deals." 166 A great uncertainty in the state's case, the
admissibility of key evidence at trial, has been resolved in its favor.'
67
III. AN IMPRISONED DEFENDANT, SUBJECT OF A WARRANTLESS
SEARCH-UNREASONABLE SEIZURE AND INEFFECTIVE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE
When a defendant is imprisoned as a result of a warrantless arrest in
Pennsylvania, the Fourth Amendment's safeguards are activated.' 6 First,
a neutral magistrate makes a prompt determination of whether probable
cause existed for the arrest. 69 The procedure ensures that the initial
arrest was valid, and that the continued "seizure" of the defendant in
prison is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.' 7  However, the
Gerstein probable cause hearing does not consider the legality of any
warrantless search that may have led to the arrest.' 7' In other words,
courts charged with ensuring the reasonableness of a prolonged
imprisonment too often do not review the Fourth Amendment's full
165. See Commonwealth v. Stafford, 416 A.2d 570, 573 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979)
(responding to a defendant's claim that his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
rights were violated because a district attorney refused to offer him a plea bargain by
stating that "[t]he decision as to whether to enter into plea negotiations is a function of
prosecutorial discretion and we will not review such decisions unless such decisions are
based upon an invidious classification").
166. Interview with Maureen Coggins, supra note 152; Interview with Benjamin Traud,
supra note 126. If the suppression motion is decided in the defendant's favor, in many
instances the charges against the defendant will be dropped for want of evidence.
Interview with Maureen Coggins, supra note 152; Interview with Benjamin Traud, supra
note 126.
167. In addition, once a case reaches the suppression hearing, the prosecution has
invested a large amount of resources and time into the case. Interview with Benjamin
Traud, supra note 126. Preparation for trial will be minimal and success at trial will be
more likely. Id.
168. See supra Part II.E.1. The Court summarized the Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103
(1975), holding in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), by stating that
"warrantless arrests are permitted but persons arrested without a warrant must promptly
be brought before a neutral magistrate for a judicial determination of probable cause." Id.
at 53.
169. See supra Part II.E.1. In addition, within ten days of the arrest, the state is
required to establish a prima facie case of the defendant's guilt in order to move forward
with its case. See supra Part II.E.1.
170. See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 70 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (warning of the possibility
of an "unreasonable seizure" when there is a delay in the probable cause determination
for a warrantless arrest of an imprisoned defendant); supra Part II.E.1; infra Part III.A.
171. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120 ("The sole issue is whether there is probable cause
for detaining the arrested person pending further proceedings.").
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guarantee-a person's security against unreasonable searches and
seizures.1" The principles that underlie the prompt application of the
Fourth Amendment's protections to a warrantless arrest equally apply to
a warrantless search. 173 Although a suppression hearing has been devised
to adjudicate the soundness of a warrantless search, its timing fails an
unreasonably incarcerated defendant.14 In addition, the delay in holding
the suppression hearing, when considered with the plea bargaining




A. The Warrantless Search that Leads to an Unreasonable Seizure
The Fourth Amendment safeguards an individual from "unreasonable
searches and seizures" by the government.176 The text of the Fourth
Amendment and its interpretation by the Supreme Court treat these two
illegal government actions equally.177 However, this parity has not been
extended to the treatment of warrantless government action that leads to
imprisonment as the Court has provided greater safeguards against
warrantless arrests than warrantless searches.
78
In Gerstein, the Court focused on individuals who were arrested
without a warrant and detained in jail.' 179 Without a pre-arrest or pre-
detention judicial determination as to the legality of the arrests, the
Court was concerned that the defendants could be subject to an ongoing
illegal seizure-imprisonment-because their arrests were based on less
than probable cause. '80 As a result, the initial illegal seizure-the
arrest-would result in an ongoing illegal seizure-the imprisonment.
The neutral magistrate was designed to protect against such violations of
172. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
173. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114 (stressing the importance of providing "meaningful
protection from unfounded interference with liberty" and of protecting against
unreasonable "extended restraint of liberty following arrest"); supra Part II.C.
174. See supra Parts II.E.3-4, III.A.
175. See supra Part III.B.
176. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
177. The text of the Fourth Amendment does not provide greater protection from
unreasonable seizures than from unreasonable searches, or vice versa. See id. The
Supreme Court has recognized this equality of protection. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S.
321, 328 (1987) (acknowledging the difference with respect to the interest each protects,
but the equality as to the level of protection the Court affords both an illegal search and
an illegal seizure); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 143 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(citing Hicks, 480 U.S. at 328, for the proposition that a search and a seizure should be
treated equally for Fourth Amendment purposes); supra note 21.
178. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114 (requiring the prompt judicial review of a
warrantless arrest when it leads to the imprisonment of a defendant).
179. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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the Fourth Amendment by the police."' But in order to protect a
defendant from an ongoing illegal seizure, the merits of the initial seizure
require quick judicial review.'82 The application of the Gerstein principle
in the area of warrantless searches is easily argued and easily applied
given the Fourth Amendment's equal treatment of searches and
seizures.
When police officers conduct a warrantless search, no judicial review
of the merits of the search is conducted as a matter of course.'4 No
181. See supra Part II.B.
182. See supra Part II.C. As the Court stated, "the [prompt] detached judgment of a
neutral magistrate [to determine the legality of an arrest] is essential if the Fourth
Amendment is to furnish meaningful protection from unfounded interference with liberty
[caused by imprisonment]." Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114.
183. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. Compare Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
19-27 (1968) (justifying warrantless police action, both search and seizure, by balancing the
government's interest against the individual's privacy interests), with Gerstein, 420 U.S. at
113-14 (applying the same balancing test but only to a warrantless seizure that leads to
imprisonment). The Court in Terry applied an analysis to a warrantless search and seizure
incident that would later be used in Gerstein's arrest scenario. In Terry, a balance was
struck between the state and the individual's competing interests. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-27.
The Court recognized the realities of police work and, therefore, permitted warrantless
searches and seizures. Id. at 22-24, 27. At the same time, the Court also realized that
"[t]he scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when . . . those
charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of
a judge." Id. at 21. The Gerstein Court achieved the same "practical compromise"
between an "individual's right to liberty and the State's duty to control crime" in the
context of a warrantless arrest. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 112-13. With respect to the state's
interests, the Court believed that warrantless arrests were needed so as not to handcuff
effective law enforcement. Id. at 113. Since police did not have to submit evidence to an
independent magistrate prior to an arrest in order to obtain an arrest warrant, the "danger
that the suspect will escape or commit further crimes" was avoided. Id. at 114. At the
same time, individual rights needed to be protected and the Court assured this protection
by requiring that a neutral and detached magistrate review a warrantless arrest. Id.
Although the "maximum protection" of pre-arrest judicial review was not feasible, "[o]nce
the suspect [was] in custody ... the reasons that justif[ied] dispensing with the magistrate's
neutral judgment evaporate[d]." Id. at 113-14. In order to obtain the fair balance, the
Court held that the judicial review of the warrantless arrest needed to occur promptly
after arrest. Id. at 114, 124-25. Unfortunately, the Court in Gerstein did not have the
chance to consider both searches and seizures like Terry and apply "promptly" to the full
Fourth Amendment in its holding.
184. See, e.g., PA. R. CRIM. P. 581 & cmt. (explaining that a defendant must "make a
motion to the court to suppress any evidence alleged to have been obtained in violation of
the defendant's rights" and noting "that failure to file the motion within the appropriate
time limit constitutes a waiver of the right to suppress"). In order to gain relief from an
unreasonable warrantless search, a defendant is required to file a motion with the court.
Id. R. 581 cmt. Contra United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105-06 (1965) (expressing
a preference for Fourth Amendment police conduct supported by a warrant); United
States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932) ("[T]he informed and deliberate
determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants as to what searches and
seizures are permissible under the Constitution are to be preferred over the hurried action
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parallel has been drawn with Gerstein to automatically require a prompt
post-search equivalent of a pre-search search warrant application hearing
for a defendant who is imprisoned. 85 As a result, in Pennsylvania, the
judicial review of a warrantless search at a suppression hearing does not
186take place for several months after the arrest, if it takes place at all.
For a defendant who is unable to make bail, the several months between
a warrantless search and a suppression hearing is time spent in jail.'87
Therefore, a warrantless search with no pre-search or pre-detention
judicial review that is deemed an "unreasonable search" at a suppression
hearing can result in the same ongoing illegal seizure of a defendant that
of officers and others who may happen to make arrests."). A valid search warrant
includes a pre-search judicial review of the basis for a search. See supra Part II.B.; see also
2 LAFAVE, supra note 20, § 4.2, at 438 ("The warrant process, it is said, 'interposes an
orderly procedure' involving 'judicial impartiality' whereby a 'neutral and detached
magistrate' can make 'informed and deliberate determinations' on the issue of probable
cause." (footnotes omitted)). But see Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 (expressing the preference for
warrants, but acknowledging that circumstances exist where they are not required). The
Supreme Court stated:
[T]he police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of
searches and seizures through the warrant procedure or that in most instances
failure to comply with the warrant requirement can only be excused by exigent
circumstances. But we deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct-
necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the
officer on the beat-which historically has not been, and as a practical matter
could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure.
Id. (citations omitted).
185. See supra note 57; supra text accompanying notes 70-71. Professor LaFave
discusses the probable cause determination for warrantless police action as follows:
When the police make an arrest or search without a warrant, they initially make
the probable cause decision themselves. The "on-the-scene assessment of
probable cause provides a legal justification for arresting a person suspected of
crime, and for a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps
incident to arrest," but an ex parte "judicial determination of probable cause [is]
a prerequisite to extended restraint on liberty following arrest." This means, of
course, that a judicial determination of probable cause for the arrest is not
constitutionally required as a matter of routine, but need occur only if the
arrestee fails to obtain his prompt release unaccompanied "by burdensome
conditions that effect a significant restraint on liberty."
Otherwise, a subsequent judicial determination of whether there was
probable cause for the warrantless police action will occur only if initiated by the
defendant upon a motion to suppress evidence claimed to be a fruit of an illegal
arrest or search.
2 LAFAVE, supra note 20, § 3.1(d), at 17-18 (emphasis added) (alteration in original)
(footnotes omitted). As Professor LaFave's account indicates, warrantless searches and
warrantless seizures are viewed alike, except in the requirements and timing of judicial
review when the warrantless action results in imprisonment. See id.
186. See supra Part II.E.3-5.
187. See supra Part II.E.1-4.
[Vol. 55:473
The Fourth Amendment Hearing
was at issue in Gerstein.8s In other words, an initial illegal search-the
warrantless search-can result in an ongoing illegal seizure-the
imprisonment. For that reason, Gerstein's rationale as applied to
warrantless seizures should also apply to warrantless searches and
prohibit the practice of delayed judicial review.
The Court has rendered the stakes "high" when defendants are
incarcerated, and therefore, the basis for imprisonment must be
legitimate and the determination of its reasonableness must be prompt. 89
Under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment,
individuals are accorded the same protection from illegal searches as
illegal seizures.' 9 If a warrantless seizure requires prompt judicial review
when it is the basis for imprisonment, it follows that prompt judicial
review should be required of a warrantless search when it is the basis for
imprisonment in order to avoid an ongoing illegal seizure. Because
Gerstein was concerned with the Fourth Amendment's ability "to furnish
meaningful protection from unfounded interference[s] with liberty,"'1 9
the requirement of prompt judicial review must cover the entire Fourth
Amendment and protect a person imprisoned due to a warrantless
seizure or a warrantless search.
B. Late Suppression Hearings Benefit the State in Plea Bargaining While
Removing the Neutral Magistrate and Eviscerating the Exclusionary Rule
of Its Purpose
By not requiring a "prompt" judicial determination of the legality of a
warrantless search for an incarcerated defendant, the timing of the
suppression hearing, in states like Pennsylvania, presents problems
beyond the possibility of an ongoing, unreasonable seizure of the
defendant. First, the district attorney's use of plea bargaining will
eliminate the essential role of the neutral magistrate in guaranteeing the
protections of the Fourth Amendment.92 Through the plea bargaining
process, the district attorney may convince the incarcerated defendant to
forgo the suppression hearing in the distant future for his immediate
release from prison.193 Second, the use of the plea bargaining system, in
188. Compare supra text accompanying notes 186-87 (an initial illegal search), with
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 116, 125 (an ongoing illegal seizure).
189. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114; supra Part II.C.
190. See supra note 177. A neutral and detached magistrate's review, either before or
after such police action, ensures this protection. See supra Part II.B.
191. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114.
192. See supra Part II.E.5.
193. See supra Part II.E.5.
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conjunction with the late suppression hearing, greatly weakens the main
purpose of the exclusionary rule-its deterrent effect on police.'94
In Pennsylvania criminal cases, various administrative steps must be
completed and several months must pass before a suppression hearing is
held and the Fourth Amendment protections applied. 95 For a defendant
who is incarcerated due to a warrantless search, this timeline provides
little solace. 96 On the other hand, for the district attorney who wishes to
efficiently and effectively dispose of his cases, the longer a defendant
spends in jail awaiting a suppression hearing, the more willing the
defendant will be to bargain for his freedom. 197 In addition, because this
period prior to the suppression hearing is the most likely time in which a
district attorney will exercise his discretion to offer a plea bargain, plea
agreements will be offered and struck prior to any judicial review of
questionable Fourth Amendment police conduct outlined in a
suppression motion. 98 Therefore, the plea bargaining process often
precludes consideration of a warrantless search by an independent
judiciary. In assessing the legality of a warrantless search that led to a
defendant's charges, the district attorney will typically confirm the
judgment of a police officer, a fellow member of the law enforcement
community. 99 Although a plea bargain must be presented and accepted
194. See supra Part II.D.
195. See supra Part II.E.1-4.
196. See supra note 52.
197. Interview with Benjamin Traud, supra note 126. The advantage the district
attorney receives at the bargaining table as a result of the defendant's vulnerable position
allows him to obtain favorable convictions with minimal resources expended. Id.
198. See supra Part II.E.5; supra note 164.
199. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117-18 (1975) (discussing why the decisions of
a prosecutor as to the merits of an arrest are not satisfactory under the Fourth
Amendment). The Court in Gerstein dismissed the state's argument that "the prosecutor's
decision to file an information is itself a determination of probable cause that furnishes
sufficient reason to detain a defendant pending trial." Id. at 117. The Court continued,
"we do not think prosecutorial judgment standing alone meets the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment," and held "that the prosecutor's assessment of probable cause is not
sufficient alone to justify restraint of liberty pending trial." Id. at 117-19; see also supra
note 28 and accompanying text. But see United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 350-52
(1974) (considering the prosecution's discretion in a grand jury proceeding as an important
reason for not applying the exclusionary rule to grand jury investigations). Although
Calandra did not apply the exclusionary rule in grand jury proceedings, it is important to
note that the Court assumed that any illegally obtained evidence presented to the grand
jury would eventually be tested by a trial proceeding. Id. at 351. In addition, the
defendant in Calandra was not imprisoned. See id. at 340-42. See generally PA. R. OF
PROF'L CONDUCT 3.8 (outlining the special responsibilities of a prosecutor and his
independence from police). According to the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional
Conduct, a prosecutor must abide by the enumerated standards when carrying out his
duties as a "minister of justice," including to "refrain from prosecuting a charge that the
prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause." Id. R. 3.8 & cmt.
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by the trial judge, the trial judge is not required to inquire into the merits
of any warrantless search that led to the charges.2l In sum, a late
suppression hearing can often mean no suppression hearing.201 Thus,
criminal procedures in states like Pennsylvania enhance the
government's plea bargaining power, and in turn, undercut an
incarcerated defendant's Fourth Amendment right to a neutral
magistrate's review of warrantless police conduct.
200. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. However, the judge's colloquy listed
in the Pennsylvania rules is the minimum inquiry a judge must make in accepting a plea.
PA. R. CRIM. P. 590 cmt. The comment to Rule 590 states that "it is difficult to formulate
a comprehensive list of questions a judge must ask of a defendant in determining whether
the judge should accept the plea of guilty." Id. Therefore, prior to accepting a guilty plea,
a trial judge may inform a defendant, who had been subject to a warrantless search, that
he has the right to contest the merits of that search through a suppression hearing.
Telephone Interview with Kelly L. Banach, supra note 134. But such an inquiry is not
required. Id. The lack of a requirement to review Fourth Amendment issues before
accepting a plea agreement may be due to the assumption that the unreasonable search or
seizure had already been completed. See Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357,
362-63 (1998); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) ("The wrong condemned by
the [Fourth] Amendment is 'fully accomplished' by the unlawful search or seizure itself...
The [exclusionary] rule thus operates as 'a judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a
personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."' (citations omitted) (quoting
Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348)). However, an incarcerated defendant can be subject to an
ongoing unreasonable seizure when his imprisonment is based on a warrantless search and
the legality of that search has never been adjudicated. See supra Part III.A. See generally
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 70 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(explaining when the lateness of a probable cause determination becomes an
"unreasonable seizure"). The plea bargaining process may or may not end an ongoing
illegal seizure. It will depend on whether the terms of the plea agreement result in the
defendant's release from prison, thereby ending any ongoing seizure. Therefore, a plea
bargain that carries with it additional jail time will not only require a defendant's waiver of
his constitutional trial rights, see supra note 158 and accompanying text, but also his
approval of a possible ongoing illegal seizure-a Fourth Amendment violation-which
may not be knowing and voluntary. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. The
possibility of such an occurrence derives from the lack of a required pre-plea bargain
judicial review of any warrantless search of an incarcerated defendant.
201. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. Compare Peter F. Nardulli, The
Societal Costs of the Exclusionary Rule Revisited, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 223, 226-28 (1987)
(discussing author's study on the impact of the exclusionary rule on the number of
suppression motions filed in felony cases), with infra note 206 (illustrating that the
majority of felony cases are disposed of by guilty pleas), and supra note 152 (discussing the
increased likelihood that the state will offer a plea agreement before a suppression
hearing). In Nardulli's first study, he found that "in felony criminal cases drawn from
samples of nine middle-sized jurisdictions in three states (Illinois, Michigan, and
Pennsylvania) . . . motions to suppress physical evidence are filed in fewer than 5%,
largely drug and weapons cases." Nardulli, supra, at 226. In Nardulli's second study,
"2,759 cases from the city of Chicago were examined to determine the role and impact of
the exclusionary rule in a major urban jurisdiction." Id. at 227. In that study, motions to
suppress physical evidence were filed in nine percent of the cases. Id.
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In the absence of judicial review of an imprisoned defendant's
warrantless search, the exclusionary rule is not applied and its purpose is
212
not served. In Calandra, the Supreme Court refused to apply the
203
exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings. The Court reasoned that
"[s]uch an extension would deter only police investigation consciously
directed toward the discovery of evidence solely for use in grand jury
investigation. [This] incentive . . . is substantially negated by the
inadmissibility of the illegally seized evidence in a subsequent criminal
prosecution of the search victim."2°4 But what if illegally seized evidence
forms the basis of a criminal conviction of a search victim because a
suppression hearing and a trial never occur? What if the grand jury
indictment, or the prosecution information in Pennsylvania, is the only
obstacle police officers need to overcome to obtain a guilty plea? With
the extensive use of plea bargains in the criminal justice system, the
"what ifs" are a reality and, as a result, Calandra's arguments against
early application of the exclusionary rule, based on the rule's eventual
application at trial, fail. The admissibility of illegally seized evidence in a
criminal trial of a search victim is never adjudicated when convictions are
obtained through plea agreements prior to a suppression hearing and
trial.2 0 ' As a result, police conduct has become directed toward the
discovery of evidence solely for use in proceedings prior to a suppression
hearing and trial and only an extension of the exclusionary rule will
effectively deter police violations of the Fourth Amendment/6
202. The late suppression hearing sets in motion a chain reaction starting with
increased jail time, see supra Part II.E.1-4, which leads to increased plea bargaining, see
supra note 197 and accompanying text, and ends in the removal of the independent
bulwark that typically exists between police officer conduct and defendants, see supra Part
II1.B. The absence of judicial review due to plea bargaining negates the utility of the
exclusionary rule. See supra text accompanying notes 151-53.
203. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354.
204. Id. at 351; see also supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing cases where
the Supreme Court refused to extend the application of the exclusionary rule). The
Court's opinion in Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357
(1998), typifies the reasoning behind the limited application of the exclusionary rule
outside the trial setting: "[B]ecause the rule is prudential rather than constitutionally
mandated, we have held it to be applicable only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its
,substantial social costs.' Recognizing these costs, we have repeatedly declined to extend
the exclusionary rule to proceedings other than criminal trials." Scott, 524 U.S. at 363
(citation omitted).
205. See supra text accompanying notes 198-201.
206. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454, 459 (1976) (requiring the
exclusionary rule to result in "appreciable deterrence" in order to apply it to a given
situation); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS- 2002, at 455 tbl.5.57 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L.
Pastore eds., 2003) (analyzing the disposition of felony cases in the sevety-five largest
counties in the United States for the year of 1998). Of the 50,284 defendants arrested and
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Since the Court "relie[s] ... on its own assumptions of human nature
and the interrelationship of the various components of the law
enforcement system" to determine questions of exclusion and deterrence
under the Fourth Amendment,'07 so must this Comment. Police officers
are trained in the nuances of Fourth Amendment law in order to ensure
that their warrantless searches are upheld in a suppression hearing.08
However, when those warrantless searches are not regularly subject to
the unbiased, critical eye of a neutral magistrate, a police officer has no
way of knowing if his conduct truly complies with the Fourth
Amendment.9 Habits form and certain types of illegal warrantless
searches may persist among police officers because the merits of such a
search are subject only to the uncritical review of a district attorney and
the evidence obtained from the search is used in a conviction that is part
of a plea bargain. 2 '0  Therefore, as a result of a plea bargain, a
suppression hearing is not held, illegal evidence is not excluded, and the
exclusionary rule does not deter future unlawful police searches.
Only by consistently having an independent judiciary apply the
exclusionary rule prior to any guilty plea in all warrantless search cases
will the prevention of police misconduct be accomplished. Otherwise,
plea agreements and their resulting partnership between police officers
and district attorneys are an invitation for police officers to ignore theA / 211
prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment. In Pennsylvania, where the
exclusionary rule is used "to remedy present violations of individual
privacy rights," an across-the-board approach-judicial review required
charged, sixty-eight percent were convicted. Id. Of those convictions, sixty-five percent
were disposed of by a plea and only three percent actually reached trial. Id. It is also
worth noting the disposition of the drug offense cases because they are the most likely to
involve a warrantless search. Interview with Benjamin Traud, supra note 126. Of the
18,336 defendants arrested and charged with a drug offense, seventy-two percent were
convicted. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, at 455 tbl.5.57. Of those convictions,
seventy percent were disposed of by pleas and three percent were convicted by trial. Id.
However, no information is provided as to the percentage of the pleas accepted prior to a
suppression hearing. See id. But see supra note 152.
207. Janis, 428 U.S. at 459.
208. Interview with Ronald Paret, Narcotics Agent for the Bureau of Narcotics
Investigation & Drug Control, Office of Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Pa.,
in Allentown, Pa. (Sept. 21, 2004). In Pennsylvania, police officers are trained in federal
and state search and seizure law. Id. Police officers receive case law updates from and
consult with government attorneys on a regular basis. Id.
209. See supra Part II.B.
210. See supra notes 199, 205 and accompanying text. When a plea agreement does
occur, the police officer's conduct is validated by the conviction even though the legality of
the officer's conduct never came to light under judicial review.
211. See supra Part III.B.
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for all warrantless searches-would seem to be the only means to
212
accomplish this goal.
IV. THE REQUIREMENT OF A PROMPT FOURTH AMENDMENT HEARING
FOR ALL IMPRISONED DEFENDANTS
In order to avoid defendants being subject to "unfounded
interference[s] with [their] liberty" in the form of imprisonment, a
neutral and detached magistrate must be required to promptly review all
warrantless Fourth Amendment police action that leads to detention." '
The principle behind a prompt Gerstein hearing for a warrantless arrest
should be extended to the determination of the merits of a warrantless
search. 1 4 The same "practical compromise" can be struck so that
warrantless searches are allowed in recognition of "the realities of law
enforcement," but such searches would require prompt judicial review to
protect "the rights of individuals." '215 The result of a prompt "Fourth
Amendment hearing," including a review of both police search and
seizure procedures, would remove the concerns outlined above. Any
216
ongoing, unreasonable seizure ends. A district attorney does not
replace the neutral magistrate in the determination of the legality of a
217
warrantless search. The defendant and the prosecutor are placed on
equal terms in a plea agreement. 28 And the deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule is restored because police know their searches are
guaranteed judicial review."'
212. See supra Part II.D.
213. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
214. A common law and historical precedent for the promptness of a warrantless
search hearing can arguably be found in footnote seventeen of Gerstein:
A similar procedure at common law, the warrant for recovery of stolen goods, is
said to have furnished the model for a "reasonable" search under the Fourth
Amendment. The victim was required to appear before a justice of the peace
and make an oath of probable cause that his goods could be found in a particular
place. After the warrant was executed, and the goods seized, the victim and the
alleged thief would appear before the justice of the peace for a prompt
determination of the cause for seizure of the goods and detention of the thief.
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 116 n.17 (emphasis added) (citing 2 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN
149-52 (1736)). If the common law required a prompt judicial determination of the merits
of a search conducted with a warrant, it surely would require a prompt judicial
determination of a warrantless search.
215. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 52-53 (1991). The Court
explained the "practical compromise" struck in Gerstein: "[W]arrantless arrests are
permitted but persons arrested without a warrant must promptly be brought before a
neutral magistrate for a judicial determination of probable cause." Id. at 53.
216. See supra Part III.A.
217. See supra Part III.B.
218. See supra Parts II.E.5, III.B.
219. See supra Part III.B.
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Many problems may arise if a Fourth Amendment hearing is
implemented in lieu of a suppression hearing. 220 The appropriate
procedural safeguards would be difficult to establish as discovery, witness
availability, and a defendant's right to counsel may be difficult to
guarantee within days, let alone hours, of a warrantless search. 2 ' In
addition, the standard of review used in a suppression hearing would
create problems as many magistrates are not attorneys and are not
222
versed in the intricacies of Fourth Amendment law. However, such
problems can be minimized if the Fourth Amendment hearing
supplements a suppression hearing in the same way the Gerstein hearing
223has supplemented a trial . The Fourth Amendment hearing is an initial
obstacle the prosecution must overcome due to the occurrence of a
warrantless search in order to detain a defendant.
In addition to the probable cause requirement outlined in Gerstein, the
prosecution would have to prove the "reasonableness" of any warrantless
search of an incarcerated defendant to a neutral magistrate at a Fourth
Amendment hearing.224 What is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment is far from clear; however, for purposes of a Fourth
Amendment hearing, an objective definition of "reasonableness" would
220. See, e.g., Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 366 (1998) ("The
exclusionary rule frequently requires extensive litigation to determine whether particular
evidence must be excluded."). In Gerstein, the Court emphasized the difficulty with a
promptness requirement "as the hearing assumes increased importance and the
procedures become more complex." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 (1975).
221. Interview with Maureen Coggins, supra note 152; see also supra Part II.E.3.
222. See PA. CONST. art. V, § 12(a) (detailing the minimal requirements to be a justice
of the peace in Pennsylvania). The Pennsylvania Constitution provides the following
qualifications to hold certain state judicial positions:
Justices, judges and justices of the peace shall be citizens of the Commonwealth.
Justices and judges ... shall be members of the bar of the Supreme Court....
[J]ustices of the peace, for a period of one year preceding their election or
appointment and during their continuance in office, shall reside within their
respective districts....
Id. Those qualified under the justice of the peace standard conduct preliminary
arraignments in Pennsylvania, the equivalent of a Gerstein hearing. Interview with
Benjamin Traud, supra note 126. In one Pennsylvania county, the district justices include
a former police officer and a former barber. Id.
223. Under this Comment, the Fourth Amendment hearing would engulf the Gerstein
hearing, since it would require a judicial review of warrantless arrests and warrantless
searches.
224. The Fourth Amendment hearing would require a two-step approach. Any
warrantless search would be considered first by the neutral and detached magistrate. If
the warrantless search is upheld, the warrantless arrest would be considered and the
evidence of the warrantless search could be used in the determination of probable cause.
If the warrantless search is not upheld, the merits of the warrantless arrest must be based
on any evidence not obtained by the search.
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need to be developed. 25 With an objective standard that can be easily
applied by a magistrate, the Fourth Amendment hearing would retain
the "informality" of a Gerstein hearing, but also recognize the
importance of prompt judicial review of all warrantless police conduct
226
that leads to imprisonment. This informal procedure would also
diminish the need for many of the safeguards provided to a defendant att 227
trial, but provide the defendant with many of the benefits of a
suppression hearing. Such a Fourth Amendment hearing would strike
225. The explanation of probable cause in Gerstein sheds light on the objective
standard of "reasonableness" that would be used in a Fourth Amendment hearing:
That standard -probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime-
traditionally has been decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary proceeding on
hearsay and written testimony, and the Court has approved these informal
modes of proof.
"In dealing with probable cause .. we deal with probabilities. These are not
technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120-21 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-75
(1949)); see also supra note 57. Because the review of any warrantless search at a Fourth
Amendment hearing would serve as a post-search equivalent of a pre-search warrant-
application hearing, the proceeding may be conducted in the same manner as a warrant
hearing.
226. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 121. The Court justified the informal procedures of a
Gerstein hearing "not only by the lesser consequences of a probable cause determination
but also by the nature of the determination itself." Id. In addition, this framework for a
Fourth Amendment hearing would respect the federalism concerns underlying the
Gerstein hearing. See supra text accompanying note 58.
227. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 121-22 (explaining that more adversary safeguards are
not needed at a probable cause hearing because guilt is not being determined). The Court
has stated that "[b]ecause of its limited function and its nonadversary character, the
probable cause determination is not a 'critical stage' in the prosecution that would require
appointed counsel." Id. at 122.
228. The early review of the warrantless search would create a record of the
circumstances surrounding the search while the details were still fresh on a police officer's
mind. Interview with Maureen Coggins, supra note 152. That same record would be a
valuable resource to the defendant as an impeachment tool in future court proceedings.
Id. In addition, Professor LaFave lists various reasons why a pre-trial suppression hearing
is beneficial to both sides, reasons that are even more applicable with a prompt Fourth
Amendment hearing:
[I]t is to the advantage of both the prosecution and defense to know in advance
of the time set for trial whether certain items will or will not be admitted into
evidence. If the pretrial motion is granted, this "may result in abandonment of
the prosecution," thus avoiding the "waste of prosecutorial and judicial resources
occasioned by preparation for trial" which otherwise would have to begin only to
be terminated at some point thereafter. Also, "[a]n adverse ruling on a pretrial
motion will permit the government to change the theory of its case, to develop or
place greater reliance upon untainted evidence or otherwise to modify its trial
strategy." If the pretrial motion is denied, then the defendant is in a position at
that time to either plead guilty and gain whatever concessions might be obtained
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the appropriate balance between state interests and individual privacy
rights, a balance that is at the core of Fourth Amendment
229jurisprudence.
V. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment provides protection from unreasonable
searches and seizures. The worst type of unreasonable seizure is an
ongoing one. The Supreme Court has recognized this fact and has
required the prompt judicial review of any warrantless arrest that leads
to imprisonment. But until the Court extends this requirement to the
other half of the Fourth Amendment, warrantless searches that result in
imprisonment, an individual's Fourth Amendment guarantees are in
jeopardy. A prompt Fourth Amendment hearing would rectify this
problem by requiring pre-detention review of warrantless searches and
warrantless seizures, ensuring a greater role for a neutral and detached
magistrate in all warrantless police action, and applying the exclusionary
rule in a way that serves its deterrent purpose. A Fourth Amendment
hearing would prevent the "unfounded interference with liberty" that a
state criminal justice system can create when a warrantless search leads
to imprisonment.
by so pleading without causing the commencement of a trial, or to go to trial with
a somewhat different defense strategy.
5 LAFAVE, supra note 20, § 11.1(a), at 5-6 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
229. The state would be permitted to carry out warrantless searches in appropriate
circumstances in recognition of the realities of police work. But if the warrantless search
resulted in the imprisonment of the defendant, an individual's privacy rights, and his
interest against an "unfounded interference with [his] liberty," would move to the
forefront and demand a prompt judicial determination of the merits of the warrantless
search. See supra notes 26, 63, and 183.
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